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 ABSTRACT  
 
The Argentine Air Force and the Brazilian Navy recently  
added  the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk aircraft to their military 
services.  Each country maintains its own limited repair 
facility and spare parts inventory.  Major repair work 
(depot-level maintenance) must be sent to the 
manufacturers in the United States, and the long repair 
cycle times adversely affect military readiness.  It is critical 
to implement an effective spare parts management system 
to compensate for such long repair cycle times.  We 
developed a simulation model to study the impact of 
consolidating aviation component spare parts inventory 
management and reducing transportation cycle times.  Our 
results indicate that both countries will greatly benefit if 
they collaborate on the inventory management of their A-4 
fleet maintenance.  Their benefits will be significantly 
increased if they change the sea transportation mode to air 
transportation for transporting avionic components back 




In 1998, the Argentine Air Force purchased thirty Douglas 
A-4 Skyhawk aircraft.  That same year the Brazilian Navy 
purchased twenty A-4s for its operations from the aircraft 
carrier Minas Gerais (A-11).  This was the first time that 
the A-4s were introduced to both countries.  The addition 
of new aircraft requires new infrastructure for logistics 
support and maintenance.  However this task cannot be  106accomplished in the short term, since both military services 
are under great pressure to reduce defense budgets and 
workforce levels due to economic recession.  Argentina 
and Brazil have limited capability to repair complex 
avionic components, and they must rely on manufacturers 
in the United States for depot level maintenance.  The long 
repair cycle times adversely affect military readiness.  It is 
critical to implement an effective spare parts management 
system to compensate for such long repair cycle times.   
Both Argentina and Brazil have strong incentives to 
collaborate to better manage their military operations.  
Argentina and Brazil have an interesting bilateral 
cooperation history, especially in economic and military 
issues.  Since 1979, when respective military regimes 
resolved Paraguays hydroelectric conflict by building the 
Itaipu Dam on the Parana River, an escalation of efforts 
and decisions have been successfully developed and 
implemented towards the stabilization of the economic 
cooperation and integration process. This integration 
covers not only economic issues such as a common 
economic market, but also educational and military 
cooperation.  This close relationship is being reinforced by 
the concrete actions taken by the authorities of both 
countries at present and envisioning the future (Kacowicz 
1999).  
In this paper, we propose collaboration of the A-4 
aircraft fleet maintenance between Argentina and Brazil.  
Successful implementation of the proposed ideas could 
encourage more collaboration of military affairs between 
these two countries.    8
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REPAIRABLE ITEM INVENTORY 
MANAGEMENT 
 
The maintenance of A-4 fleet for both Argentina and Brazil 
is similar to the United States Navys three levels of 
maintenance: organizational level (O-level), intermediate 
level (I-level), and depot level (D-level).  O-level 
maintenance is performed at the operational site 
(squadron), involving simple repairs and replacements of 
modular components to support its own operations.  I-level 
maintenance involves more difficult repairs and 
maintenance, including the repair and testing of modules 
that have been forwarded from the O-level.  I-level 
maintenance is performed ashore in the air stations or 
afloat in aircraft carriers.  D-level maintenance ensures the 
continued flight integrity and safety of airframes and 
related flight systems throughout their service lives. 
(Blanchard 1998) This involves performing maintenance 
beyond the capabilities of the lower levels, usually on 
equipment requiring major overhaul or rebuilding of end 
items, subassemblies, and parts. The following is a brief 
description of the A-4 maintenance system.   
When an aircraft fails, the faulty component (e.g., 
digital mission computer, or engine) is removed from the 
aircraft at the O-level and a spare part is obtained from an 
inventory location at the base and installed on the aircraft; 
thereby restoring it to full mission capability.  If a spare 
part is unavailable, the aircraft must be grounded, thereby 
negatively affecting fleet readiness.  The faulty component 
is forwarded to the I-level maintenance facility.  Repairs 
beyond the I-level capability are forwarded to the D-level.  
The repaired components are shipped back to the spare 
parts pool at the inventory location.  Currently both the 
Argentine Air Force and the Brazilian Navy maintain their 
own I-level maintenance facility, but D-level maintenance 
takes place in the United States.  Thus those items 
requiring D-level maintenance must be shipped to the 
United States.   
The D-level maintenance takes anywhere from three to 
six months including transportation delays.  Since long 
turnaround times adversely affect the readiness of A-4 
squadrons, it is critical to maintain adequate inventory 
levels for spare parts to maintain to compensate for long 
repair cycle times.  However, budget constraints have 
pressure to reduce inventory levels since aviation spare 
parts are very expensive and have long acquisition lead 
times.   
The goal of military logistics support is to maintain the 
highest possible readiness, commonly expressed as 
operational availability, A0 = MTBM / (MTBM + MDT) =   
uptime / (uptime + downtime), where MTBM is the mean 
time between maintenance and MDT is the maintenance 
downtime that includes repair, transportation, and 
administrative/ logistics delay times.  Intuitively, 10 
operational availability is the fraction of time a weapon 
system is operational or mission capable. Clearly, an 
operational availability can be improved by increasing 
MTBM (i.e., increasing reliability) or decreasing MDT 
(i.e., reducing maintenance cycle time)  (Kang, Gue and 
Eaton 1998).  In this paper we propose (i) spare parts 
inventory consolidation between Argentine and Brazilian 
aircraft maintenance, which provides better spare 
availability, thus reducing the chance of unnecessary 
grounding aircraft; and (ii) transportation time reduction 
for D-level maintenance to reduce MDT, which in turn will 
improve operational availability.   
 
3 SIMULATION MODEL  
 
3.1 Baseline Model Description 
 
In this section, we describe the baseline simulation model 
developed in ARENA simulation language (Kelton, 
Sadowski and Sadowski 1998).  Details of the model and 
additional analyses beyond what is described in this paper 
is available in Rodrigues and Karpowicz (1999).  Sufficient 
data on avionic component reliability was unavailable from 
the Argentine Air Force or the Brazilian Navy since their 
A-4 fleet operation started in 1998, and both are still 
training the pilots and maintenance personnel.  The 
Brazilian Navy is also in the process of upgrading 
equipment and remodeling the aircraft carrier Minas Gerais 
(A-11) to include I-level maintenance capability. The data 
presented in this paper was obtained from the Naval 
Aviation Depot-North Island, California and modified 
based on the projected flying hours and operating 
environments.  
We consider two different types spare parts: line-
replaceable unit (LRU) and shop-replaceable unit (SRU). 
An LRU is an avionic subassembly essential for the A-4 
aircrafts primary flying mission performance.  Examples 
of LRUs are digital mission computers and radar 
altimeters. Each LRU consists of several subcomponents 
called shop-replaceable units (SRU).  Examples of an SRU 
include circuit cards and high voltage power supplies.   
We have chosen five critical LRUs for our spare parts 
inventory analysis: Digital Mission Computer (LRU_1), 
Radio Altimeter (LRU_2), Air Data Computer (LRU_3), 
Inertial Navigation Unit (LRU_4), and Head up Display 
Unit (LRU_5).  Both Argentina and Brazil have limited 
capability of repairing these electronic components, so the 
majority of repair work is performed in the United States.   
We also consider two SRUs: Torque Drive Power 
Supply Module (a subcomponent of the Radio Altimeter 
(LRU_2), and will be referred to as SRU_2), and Sensor 
Assembly (a subcomponent of the Inertial Navigation Unit 
(LRU_4) and will be referred to as SRU_4).  These two 
SRUs were chosen because they are the primary causes of 
LRU failures.  For these LRUs, they do not have to send 69
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 an entire LRU to the United States for repair in case of a 
specific SRU failure. The faulty SRU is removed from the 
LRU and replaced with an SRU from the spare parts pool.  
The LRU can be returned to the spare pool and only the 
faulty SRU is sent to the United States for repair.  Table 1 
presents the inventory level for each LRU spare parts pool 
and the two SRUs.   
 
Table 1:  Number of Spares for Each LRU/SRU for 
the Argentine Air Force and the Brazilian Navy 













Argentina 3 2 2 3 3 3 5 
Brazil 2 3 3 2 2 7 5 
 
Table 2 provides the mean time between failures of 
LRUs (in days).  These numbers were based on the data 
obtained from the Naval Aviation Deport-North Island, 
California. We assume that the projected flying hours for 
each aircraft is 30 hours per month, and that the failure 
times follow an exponential distribution.  We note that the 
mean time between failures (MTBF) of Brazilian aircraft is 
significantly lower since these aircraft operate from the 
aircraft carrier while the Argentine Air Force aircraft 
operate from a land-based air station.  The carrier-based 
aircraft are more exposed to the sea elements of corrosion 
and have more stress from carrier takeoffs and landings. 
 
Table 2:  Mean Time between Failures (MTBF) 
of LRUs  (unit: days) 
 Argentine Brazil 
LRU_1 220.5 147.0 
LRU_2 270.0 180.0 
LRU_3 174.0 116.0 
LRU_4 146.0  97.4 
LRU_5 272.0 181.0 
 
 
When an LRU fails, an RFI (ready-for-issue; i.e., good 
part) LRU from the spare parts pool is installed.  The faulty 
LRU becomes an input to the I-level to be repaired and 
returned to the spare parts pool as an RFI item.  The time 
for removal/installation of LRU is assumed to have 
triangular distribution with a minimum of 0.250 days, a 
mode of 0.375 days and a maximum of 0.500 days.  Time 
for inspection to determine the appropriate level of 
maintenance (i.e., I-level or D-level maintenance) follows 
a uniform distribution with a lower bound of 0.125 days 
and a upper bound, 0.375 days.  Table 3 provides the 
percentage of the LRUs at the I-level that are considered 
beyond capability of maintenance (BCM) and are sent to 
the United States for D-level maintenance. 
When an LRU fails, if an RFI LRU is unavailable, the 
aircraft is grounded until one is available.   The mean time 107to repair (MTTR) for each LRU at the I-level maintenance 
facility is presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 3:  Percentage of LRUs Sent to the U.S. 
for D-level Maintenance  







Table 4:  Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) for LRUs 







All faulty SRUs are considered beyond capability of 
maintenance, and are shipped to the United States for 
repair. Table 5 presents the time spent when a faulty part is 
sent to (northbound) and from (southbound) the United 
States for repair using sea mode transportation.  It takes 
longer time for northbound route than southbound because 
of an additional delay for warranty verification and 
document processing before sending the faulty part to 
overseas.  We assumed that the distributions of the 
transportation times and D-level repair time follow the 
uniform distribution.   
 
Table 5:  Repair Cycle Times for D-level Sent to and from 
the U. S. using Sea Transportation 
Activity Time 
Northbound route  administrative 
process (including warranty 
verification process time) plus 
transportation. 
30 to 45 days 
Southbound route administrative 
process plus transportation. 20 to 40 days 




The following assumptions were made to use the model. 
 
• We are analyzing electronic components.  Thus, 
we assume no need for preventive maintenance. 
• The LRU/SRUs can be always repaired; no 
condemnations are considered. 0
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pool. 
• Aircraft failures are always due to only one of the 
LRUs.  Consequently, LRUs do not fail at the 
same time. 
• The I-level repair shop operates eight hours a day. 
• There is a single point of destination in the United 
States and a single point of origin for LRU/SRUs 
transportation computations (for time and cost 
estimates). 
• No cannibalizations are considered.  Hence, the 
fleet operational availability may be less in the 
simulation model than in real circumstances, but 
we considered the fact that cannibalization 
increases the maintenance man-hours required to 
repair the aircraft and can induce malfunctions to 
an otherwise serviceable LRU through additional 




We ran two scenarios; one for the Argentine Air Force and 
the other for the Brazilian Navy.  Fifty replications were 
made for each scenario over a ten-year period, since it is 
reasonable to assume that the life cycle of military avionic 
components is 10 years.  As shown in Table 6, the 
operational availability of the Brazilian Navy A-4 fleet is 
83.98% and the Argentine Air Force, 86.58%.  Since the 
Brazilian aircraft operates from the aircraft carrier, their 
operational availability is lower than the Argentine aircraft.  
Table 6 also shows the number of LRU/SRUs sent to the 
United States over the 10 year life cycle period, generated 
from the simulation. These values will be used for cost 
calculations in the next section.   
 
4 INVENTORY CONSOLIDATION  
(COALITION MODEL) 
 
4.1 Model Description 
 
In this section, we discuss the embellishment of the 
baseline model described in Section 3.  We added stock 
consolidation for spare parts inventory, i.e., the Argentine 
Air Force and the Brazilian Navy share spare parts 
inventory.  There are two ways of implementing this 
inventory consolidation idea: physical consolidation and 
virtual consolidation.  For physical consolidation, 
Argentina and Brazil maintain one inventory stock point.  
For virtual consolidation, they maintain inventory in two 
different locations but are capable of tracking the 
movements of parts in the system.  Both methods would 
add additional transportation time that may or may not be 
significant.  We did not include this delay in our simulation 
model.  This model is referred to as the coalition model. 
The assumptions and the data are the same as the previous 10 
baseline model in Section 3, except that the coalition 
model assumes one spare parts inventory for both 
Argentina and Brazil.  The number of spare parts to be kept 
at the consolidated stock point for each LRU/SRU is as 
shown in Table 7.  These numbers are the sums of the 
existing inventories of LRU/SRUs for both countries. 
 
Table 6:  Number of LRU/SRUs Sent to the U. S. 
for D-level Repair, and the Average Operational 
Availability over 10-year Life Cycle 
 Argentine Brazil 
LRU1    58    53 
LRU2    53    51 
LRU3    85    89 
LRU4    87   115 
LRU5    43    39 
SRU2     8     8 
SRU4    25    31 
TOTAL LRUs   326   347 
TOTAL SRUs    33    39 
Operational Availability  0.8658 0.8368 
 























After 50 replications, the results show an increase in the 
operational availability from 83.97% and 86.57%, for the 
Brazilian and Argentine fleet, respectively, to 88.84%, for 
both fleet operating under the coalition model.  It implies 
that Brazil will have an additional 0.973 aircraft [= 20 * 
(0.8884 - .8397)], and Argentina will have an additional 
0.678 aircraft [30 * (0.8884  0.8658)] by sharing their 
spare parts.  We may also state that at a given desired 
operational availability, the consolidated stock point 
requires fewer spares than two individually managed stock 
points.    
The simulation results show the advantages of 
operational availability for the coalition model.  To 
implement the stock consolidation described in the 
coalition model, Argentina and Brazil should be willing to 
develop a total asset visibility department that can keep 
track of avionic components in the system. Implementation 
of such organizational changes is the subject of further 
studies. 71
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5 COALITION MODEL WITH REDUCED 
TRANS-PORTATION TIME 
 
We ran the coalition model again, but this time we reduce 
the transportation time to analyze the impact on the 
operational availability of the A-4 fleet. 
 
5.1 Transportation Time Reduction 
 
The models discussed in the previous sections used sea 
mode transportation.  These transportation times include 
administrative process delays and delivery time.  Since the 
sea transportation is the main contributor of  long cycle 
times and a readiness degrader, we propose a reduction of 
transportation time by changing  to air transportation mode.  
Table 8 shows the estimated cycle times for the repair 
cycle times for D-level maintenance.  Uniform distribution 
is assumed in the simulation run for these repair cycle 
times. 
 
Table 8:  Repair Cycle Times for D-level Sent to and from 
the U. S. Using Air Transportation 
Activity Time  
Northbound route administrative 
process (including warranty 
verification process time) plus 
transportation. 
10  15 days 
Southbound route administrative 
process plus transportation. 8  13 days 
Repairing LRU/SRU at D-level in 
the U. S.  30  90 days 
 
We have collected cost and delivery time data for air 
transportation from the survey of domestic and 
international freight forwarders.  Table 9 shows the 
average cost of transportation by express air mode (2 day 
delivery) for each LRU/SRU based on weight and size 




After 50 replications, faster transportation times (air 
transportation instead of sea) will increase operational 
availability of the fleet by approximately 6%  (from 88.9% 
to 95.0%).  This represents having an additional 3.5 aircraft 
[3.5= 50*(0.950340.88838)] without increasing the 
number of spare parts.  A simple calculation of the total air 
transportation cost over 10-year period is less than one 
million dollars, which is calculated by multiplying the 
number of LRU/SRUs transported to the United States in 
Table 4 by the transportation costs shown in Table 9.  The 
benefit of having an additional 3.5 aircraft far exceed the 
extra transportation cost considering fact that each aircraft 
costs more than $6 million dollars. 
 
10Table 9:  Cost of Express Air Delivery of 
LRU/ SRUs from and to the U. S. for Repair.   




Express Air Delivery 
+ Insurance 
LRU_1        $1,401 
LRU_2          $432 
LRU_3        $1,396 
LRU_4        $1,587 
LRU_5        $1,589 
SRU_2          $277 
SRU_4          $277 
 
Improvement in operational availability through the 
reduction in transportation time can be explained by 
Littles Law (1961); faster transportation time reduces 
pipeline inventory at the repair shop.  It implies that more 
spare parts at the inventory stock point are ready for the 
fleet, thus unnecessary aircraft grounding awaiting for 
spare parts is reduced.  Figures 1 and 2 show the result.  
Figure 1 presents the simulation results of the number of 
grounded aircraft due to the shortage of each LRU over a 
10-year period using slow sea transportation.  Figure 2 
presents the same simulation results using express (2-day) 
air transportation. 
 




• The consolidation of the Argentine Air Force and the 
Brazilian Navy aviation electronic component 
inventories will benefit both Armed Forces in higher 
fleet operational availability.  It provides an average 
increase of 0.678 aircraft over a period of ten years for 
Argentina, and an additional 0.973 aircraft for 
Brazilians. Reducing transportation time by changing 
from sea transportation mode to air mode will also 
increase the fleet operational availability by 
approximately 6%.  This represents having an 
additional 3.5 aircraft without increasing the spare 
parts. 
• The concept of fast repair cycle time was highlighted 
by observing that using a rapid and responsive 
shipping mode, such as air mode, will reduce the 
volume of spare items required in the system inventory 
to achieve a specific A0.  Although the air 
transportation cost for an LRU/SRU is more expensive 
than the sea transportation cost, this additional expense 
is by far offset by having additional availability of 
aircraft for higher military readiness.  72
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Figure 1:  Average Number of Grounded Aircraft due 
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Figure 2:  Average Number of Grounded Aircraft due 




The lessons learned our analyses suggest: 
 
• Taking advantage of the political times that Brazil 
and Argentina are enjoying in terms of an 
integration process, a collaborative inventory 
management of their A-4 fleet should be analyzed 
and implemented.  This will bring economical and 
operational advantages to both Argentina and 
Brazil. 
• We strongly recommend the reduction in 
transportation cycle time by changing from sea 
mode to air mode as the way of shipping aviation 
electronic components to manufacturers in the 
United States for D-level maintenance. 
• Critical components must be closely tracked and 
have their related data accurately recorded.  
Historical data collection of Mean Time Between 
Failures, Mean Time To Repair and so on, is 
important.  We encountered a lack of information 
during our data collection process from the 
Argentine Air Force and the Brazilian Navy.  
Different explanations were given such as 
information was unavailable at the time of the A-4 
aircraft acquisition, lack of resources, poor 10 
managerial tools and organizational cultural 
reasons.  
• We suggest further studies to analyze the 
implementation of total asset visibility between 
the Brazilian Navy and the Argentine Air Force 
inventory systems, and the possibilities to 
standardize critical components for both the A-4 
aircraft fleet to make the inventory consolidation 
more effective. 
• Advantages of joint contracting policies for 
acquisition, repairing, and shipping of aircraft 
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